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Abstract— This paper considers information sharing in a multi-
player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset
of components of a random vector and then takes a control action.
The utility earned by each player depends on the full random
vector and on the actions of others. An example is a game where
different rewards are placed over multiple locations, each player
only knows the rewards in a subset of the locations, and players
compete to collect the rewards. Sharing information can help
others, but can also increase competition for desirable locations.
Standard Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium concepts
are inadequate in this scenario. Instead, this paper develops an
algorithm where, every round, all players pass their information
and intended actions to a game manager. The manager provides
suggested actions for each player that, if taken, maximize a
concave function of average utilities subject to the constraint
that each player gets an average utility no worse than it would
get without sharing. The algorithm acts online using information
given at each round and does not require a specific model of
random events or player actions. Thus, the analytical results of
this paper apply in non-ergodic situations with any sequence of
actions taken by human players.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers a stochastic game where each player
has incomplete information. A central issue is whether or
not this information should be shared. Indeed, players with
special access to desirable information may prefer to keep
this information private. The goal of this paper is to design
an efficient collaborative strategy that allows players to share
information without sacrificing their own interests.
The general game structure is as follows: There are N
players that repeatedly play a game over a sequence of rounds
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. On each round t, there is a random event
vector ω(t) = (ω1(t), . . . , ωM (t)) that describes characteris-
tics of the game for that round. The value M is a positive
integer that can be different from N . Each player can observe
a portion of the components of the ω(t) vector. Specifically,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, define Si as the subset of indices
in {1, . . . ,M} that are observable by player i. Every round t,
each player i observes its components of ω(t) and then chooses
an action αi(t) based on this (incomplete) information. Define
α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) as the joint action vector. The
resulting round-t payoff for player i is ui(t), also called the
utility. The utility ui(t) is a general function of α(t) and ω(t):
ui(t) = uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
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Each player wants to earn a large time average utility ui:
ui = lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
ui(τ)
Pooling information about the ω(t) vector and making a
team decision can improve the sum utility. However, individual
players may want to keep their information private to increase
their own utility.
A. Example game structure
10# 0# 7# 2#
2# 3# 2# 0#
1# 2# 2# 2#
4# 2# 5# 2#
Fig. 1. An illustration of a 3-player location-reward game. Locations known
only to player i are blue, yellow, red for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, respectively. Locations
known to both players 1 and 2 are green, players 2 and 3 are orange, and
players 3 and 1 are purple.
Consider a square region that is partitioned into M disjoint
sub-regions, called locations (see Fig. 1 with M = 16 loca-
tions). Every round, a random reward ωm(t) appears in each
location m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Let ω(t) = (ω1(t), . . . , ωM (t)) be
the vector of current rewards. For example, ω(t) might be a
random vector that is independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) over rounds t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} with some arbitrary joint
probability distribution. Suppose there are 3 players:
• Player 1 knows rewards for the blue, purple, and green
squares.
• Player 2 knows rewards for the yellow, green, and orange
squares.
• Player 3 knows rewards for the red, orange, and purple
squares.
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2Every round, each player chooses a single location where
it competes for the current reward. Specifically, for each i ∈
{1, 2, 3}, let Ai be a subset of {1, . . . ,M} that represents the
set of locations player i is allowed to choose from, called the
action set for player i. The sets Ai and Si can be different,
so that a player might choose a location in which she does
not know the reward. Let αi(t) be the location in Ai chosen
by player i on round t. If a player is the only one to choose
a certain location m, she earns the full reward ωm(t). Else,
the reward is split evenly amongst all players who choose that
location. Specifically, for each m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} define Km(t)
as the number of players who choose location m on round t.
The resulting utility for player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is:
ui(t) =
ωαi(t)(t)
Kαi(t)(t)
This utility is indeed a function of the vectors α(t) and ω(t):
uˆi(α, ω) =
ωαi∑3
n=1 1{αn = αi}
(1)
where 1{αn = αi} is an indicator function that is 1 if αn =
αi, and 0 else. The denominator in (1) is always nonzero since
1{αi = αi} = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For the scenario illustrated in Fig. 1, player 1 is the only one
to see the highly desirable reward of 10 that is currently in the
top left location. Player 1 might want to keep this information
private to reduce the chance of other players competing for
the same location.
B. Prior work on repeated games
Adaptive methods that converge to a correlated equilibrium
for repeated play of static games are developed in [1][2][3].
Correlated equilibrium in stochastic games is considered in
[4][5]. The formulation of the current paper is the most similar
to [5], where a game manager helps to achieve correlated and
coarse correlated equilibrium in repeated stochastic games.
However, the prior work [1][2][3][4][5] does not consider
the problem of information sharing, and so the notions of
equilibrium they study do not directly apply in the current
context. Further, the work on stochastic games in [4][5]
considers an ergodic regime, while the current paper considers
arbitrary sample paths that are possibly non-ergodic.
C. Inadequacy of standard equilibrium definitions
Standard definitions of Nash equilibrium [6][7], correlated
equilibrium [8][9], and coarse correlated equilibrium [10] are
inadequate in the scenario of this paper. That is because such
equilibrium definitions require the utility of each player i to be
at least as large as it would be if player i individually deviated
from the intended strategy while all other players continue to
use the intended strategy. However, if player i deviates by
choosing not to share information, the intended strategies of
others may no longer be possible because they might rely on
this information.
In principle, one could circumvent this difficulty by forcing
the repeated game structure to look like a 1-shot game for
which standard notions of equilibrium exist. For example, this
could be done by allowing each player to make a binary
decision at the start that determines whether or not she will
share information. Her remaining decisions can be viewed as
an element of a strategy space defined over infinite sequences
of actions. This approach is taken in [4] by using the concept
of infinitely punishing deviant behavior (also see discussions in
[11]). There, players are assigned strategies that require them
to maximally punish any non-conformist by taking actions
(for all time) that are solely designed to yield poor utility for
the non-conformist. This can lead to an equilibrium because
such punishment never occurs (since all players conform out
of fear), and so (mathematically) players do not object to
having an unused requirement to punish others as part of their
decision strategy. However, this approach does not necessarily
capture realistic behavior. Human players will not spend the
rest of their lives punishing a non-conformist. Rather, human
players will adapt their behavior to emerging conditions. The
mathematical threat of infinite punishment is seen to be a sham
that lacks power to realistically influence behavior.
A modified definition of subgame perfect equilibrium is
often used as an attempt to make punishment threats credible
[11]. It requires equilibrium-type conditions to be met even for
unused punishment modes of a strategy. Such conditions can
often be met by using finite-length punishment modes. How-
ever, in many repeated games, such modes can be appended to
almost any strategy to endow that strategy with the subgame
perfect equilibrium property (see theorems on repeated games
with time average utility metrics in [11]).
Overall, while prior notions of equilibrium for repeated
games exist and have well defined mathematical properties,
they can be complex and difficult for humans to interpret.
Arguably, a human player wants a more direct comparison of
the suggested strategy with some other reasonable course of
action. This paper uses a much simpler “no regret” guarantee
that compares the suggestions to a single baseline strategy,
rather than to all possible strategies. The baseline strategy is
defined by any alternative sequence of actions that a player
wants to consider. The challenge is to dynamically make
suggestions as the game is being played. The suggestions must
meet the desired performance for arbitrary sample paths, and
therefore must adapt as new events emerge.
D. The game manager
This paper deviates from the standard equilibrium approach
by assuming the existence of a game manager to which players
pass their information. Further, every round it is assumed that
each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} has a baseline decision bi(t) ∈ Ai.
The baseline decision bi(t) is any decision the human player
would choose if she were operating on her own without a
manager and without information sharing. The manager takes
the given information every round t and produces suggested
actions for each player. The suggested actions must have the
property that, if every player uses the suggestions, a concave
function of average utilities across players is maximized
subject to the constraint that each player receives an average
utility at least as large as the average value it would earn if
all players used their baseline strategies. The running average
3utility gains between the suggested and baseline strategies can
be given to each player on each round. The understanding is
that players have more incentive to take suggested actions if
they see the gains of doing so. This approach does not rely
on punishment modes in a complex strategy space.
This formulation is interesting because it defines a specific
optimization problem that uses the (possibly human-generated)
sequence of baseline strategies as part of the optimization.
The solution approach uses Lyapunov optimization theory
in this new context. Lyapunov optimization is known to
have universal scheduling properties that provide analytical
guarantees for arbitrary sequences [12]. Those properties are
used in the game theory context of this paper to provide a
simple online algorithm for making manager decisions as the
game is played. This paper shows that the resulting algorithm
provides analytical guarantees for arbitrary baseline sequences
and arbitrary event sequences, including sequences with no
probabilistic description.
II. EXAMPLES
To gain intuition, this section provides examples of a 2-
player location-reward game with only two locations. The
random event vectors ω(t) = (ω1(t), ω2(t)) are assumed to
be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over rounds
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. This allows exact computation of average
utility associated with different strategies. The examples are
designed to show that willingness to share information can
depend on the statistical distribution of rewards and also on
the constraint sets of individual players. For simplicity, the
examples in this section assume the full joint probability
distribution of (ω1(t), ω2(t)) is known by both players. The
general model of Section III treats a more complex scenario
where the event vectors ω(t) are arbitrary sequences, possibly
non-ergodic sequences with no known probabilistic structure.
2.2# ω2(t)#
Fig. 2. A location-reward game with two locations and two players. Player
1 knows the reward in the left location, but this reward is always 2.2. Player
2 knows the random reward ω2(t) in the right location.
A. Example 1: Beneficially withholding information
Consider a location-reward game (as described in Section
I-A) with two players and two locations, as shown in Fig. 2.
Player 1 knows the reward ω1(t) associated with location 1
and player 2 knows the reward ω2(t) associated with location
2. Every round, player 1 can choose from either of the two
locations. However, suppose that player 2 is restricted to only
choosing location 2. The reward probabilities are:
ω1(t) = 2.2 with probability 1
ω2(t) =
{
10 with probability 1/5
2 with probability 4/5
The vectors ω(t) = (ω1(t), ω2(t)) are i.i.d. over rounds t, and
the above probabilities are known to both players. Player 2 is
the only one with knowledge of the actual realization of the
time-varying reward in location 2.
1) Without sharing information: Suppose player 2 does
not share its knowledge. If player 1 chooses location 2, its
expected utility is 5(1/5)+1(4/5) = 1.8, which is strictly less
than the utility of 2.2 it would achieve by choosing location 1.
Hence, the optimal strategy for player 1 is to always choose
location 1. Assuming that player 1 uses this optimal strategy,
the resulting average utilities are:
u1 = 2.2 (2)
u2 = 10(1/5) + 2(4/5) = 3.6 (3)
2) Sharing information: Suppose player 2 chooses to al-
ways divulge the value of ω2(t) before either player makes
a decision. In this case, it is optimal for player 1 to choose
location 2 whenever ω2(t) = 10, and to choose location 1
otherwise. The resulting utilities under this strategy are:
u1 = 2.2(4/5) + 5(1/5) = 2.76
u2 = 2(4/5) + 5(1/5) = 2.6
In comparison to the utilities of (2)-(3), it is clear that player
1 increases her utility by taking advantage of the shared
information. However, player 2 reduces her utility because she
now competes for the desirable reward of 10 when that reward
appears. Thus, in this example, player 2 has no incentive to
share information. Player 2 prefers to keep her information
private.
B. Example 2: Beneficially sharing information
Consider the same two-player location-reward game as the
previous subsection. The only difference is that the reward
probabilities are different:
ω1(t) = 2.2 with probability 1 (4)
ω2(t) =
{
10 with probability 1/2
2 with probability 1/2 (5)
1) Without sharing information: Without sharing informa-
tion, it is optimal for player 1 to always choose location 2.
The resulting utilities under this strategy are:
u1 = u2 = 5(1/2) + 1(1/2) = 3
2) Sharing information: If player 2 shares ω2(t) with
player 1 every round t, then the optimal strategy for player
1 is to choose location 2 whenever ω2(t) = 10, and choose
location 1 otherwise. The resulting utilities under this optimal
strategy are:
u1 = 2.2(1/2) + 5(1/2) = 3.6
u2 = 2(1/2) + 5(1/2) = 3.5
In this example, sharing information allows both players to
increase their average utility. Player 2 wins by revealing the
value of ω2(t) because it discourages player 1 from competing
when the reward is small.
4The examples in Sections II-A and II-B show that changing
the probability distribution of random events can impact
the optimality or sub-optimality of sharing information. The
problem treated in this paper is even more challenging because
the probabilities are unknown and can possibly change.
C. Example 3: Unrestricted actions
Now consider the same example of the previous subsection,
with the same reward probabilities as (4)-(5). The only differ-
ence is that now both players 1 and 2 are free to select either
of the two locations.
1) Without sharing information: Without knowledge of
ω2(t), it is optimal for player 1 to always choose location
2. Indeed, the smallest expected reward it can earn by doing
this is computed by assuming it must always share its rewards
in location 2, and this leads to a value of 5/2+1/2 = 3 > 2.2.
If player 2 assumes that player 1 uses its optimal policy, then
its best strategy is to choose location 2 whenever ω2(t) = 10,
and to choose location 1 if ω2(t) = 2. Under these optimized
strategies, the utilities are:
u1 = 5(1/2) + 2(1/2) = 3.5
u2 = 5(1/2) + 2.2(1/2) = 3.6
2) Sharing information: Suppose player 2 shares ω2(t)
with player 1 every round t. In this case, it is optimal for both
players to choose location 2 whenever ω2(t) = 10. However,
the optimal decisions for players 1 and 2 are unclear when
ω2(t) = 2, since optimality of each player depends on the
policy implemented by the other. However, the highest utility
that player 2 can achieve is 3.6 (which assumes it always
gets exclusive access to the 2.2 reward in location 1 when
ω2(t) = 2). Thus, at best, player 2 can only achieve the same
utility by sharing its information, but more likely stands to
loose utility when this information is shared. Therefore, in
this example, a rational and self-interested player 2 would not
want to share information.
III. THE GENERAL MODEL
Fix N as an integer larger than 1. Suppose there are
N players that play a game over rounds t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Define N = {1, . . . , N} as the set of players. Fix M as
a positive integer (possibly different from N ) and suppose
that ω(t) = (ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωM (t)) is a sequence of event
vectors over rounds t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Assume that ω(t) takes
values in some abstract (possibly infinite) set Ω on each
round t. The vector sequence ω(t) is otherwise arbitrary and
can have arbitrary correlations over entries and over time.
A probabilistic description of ω(t) is not necessarily known
to the players, and such a probabilistic description may not
even exist. For each i ∈ N , define Si as the subset of
{1, . . . ,M} associated with components of ω(t) that player
i can observe at the beginning of each round. That is, player
i knows ωj(t) for all j ∈ Si and for all t. It is assumed that
∪Ni=1Si = {1, . . . ,M}, so that the combined knowledge of all
players gives the full ω(t) vector.
Every round t, each player i ∈ N observes its compo-
nents of ω(t) and chooses an action αi(t) as an element in
some abstract (possibly infinite) action set Ai. Let α(t) =
(α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) be the action vector. The resulting utility
ui(t) earned by player i on round t is a general function of
α(t) and ω(t):
ui(t) = uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) ∀i ∈ N
A. Assumptions
The functions uˆi(α, ω) are assumed to be non-negative and
upper-bounded. Specifically, for each i ∈ N , assume there is
a maximum utility value umaxi <∞ such that:
0 ≤ uˆi(α, ω) ≤ umaxi ∀(α, ω) ∈ A1 × · · · × AN × Ω
For simplicity, further assume the utility functions are such
that for every ω ∈ Ω, the problem of choosing an action
vector α = (α1, . . . , αN ) to maximize a weighted sum of
utilities has a well defined (possibly non-unique) maximizing
solution α∗. Specifically, the following problem has a well
defined maximum (so that the supremum objective function
value is achievable) for all possible real numbers βi:
Maximize:
∑N
i=1 βiuˆi(α, ω) (6)
Subject to: αi ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N (7)
This is a mild assumption that holds in most practical cases.1
For example, (6)-(7) is guaranteed to have a maximizing
solution α∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
N ) when all sets Ai are finite. It
is also guaranteed to have a well defined maximizer when
the sets Ai are infinite but are compact subsets of a finite-
dimensional vector space, and when the utility functions
uˆi(α, ω) are continuous in α for all ω ∈ Ω.
The utility functions are otherwise arbitrary. In particular,
they are not required to have convexity or concavity properties.
B. Baseline actions and the game manager
Every round t, each player i observes ωj(t) for all j ∈ Si
and then makes a baseline decision bi(t) ∈ Ai. The resulting
sequence {bi(t)}∞t=0 can be arbitrary and has no assumed
structure. However, the understanding is that the baseline
decision on round t is an action that player i would want
to take if it did not have access to shared information or to
suggestions of a game manager. It can be based on the player
i observations of current and past events.
At the beginning of each round t, all players i ∈ N privately
upload their observations ωj(t) (for all j ∈ Si) and their
baseline decisions bi(t) to the game manager. Thus, on round
t, the manager knows the full ω(t) vector, all of the baseline
decisions bi(t), and the complete history of past events. It is
assumed that the manager has only causal knowledge, and
hence it does not know the future values ω(τ) and bi(τ)
for τ > t. The manager uses its information on round t
to compute suggested actions α˜i(t) ∈ Ai that it delivers to
each individual player. Define α˜(t) = (α˜1(t), . . . , α˜N (t)) and
b(t) = (b1(t), . . . , bN (t)).
1Assuming existence of a maximizer α∗ for the problem (6)-(7) simplifies
exposition but is not crucial to the analysis. This assumption can be avoided
by using the C-additive approximation theory in [12].
5C. An (overly?) ambitious optimization problem
Define ui(t) and xi(t) for each i ∈ N and each t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .} by:
ui(t) = uˆi(α˜(t), ω(t))
xi(t) = uˆi(b(t), ω(t))
The value ui(t) is the utility earned by player i on round
t if all players choose the suggested actions, while xi(t) is
the corresponding utility if all players choose their baseline
decisions. Define time averages for all t > 0 by:
ui(t) =
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
uˆi(α˜(t), ω(t))
xi(t) =
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
uˆi(b(t), ω(t))
It is useful to introduce an ambitious optimization problem that
will be modified later. Subject to the emerging ω(t) and b(t)
sequences, the goal is for the manager to make suggestions
α˜(t) that solve the following:
Maximize: lim inft→∞ φ(u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) (8)
Subject to: lim inft→∞[ui(t)− xi(t)] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (9)
α˜i(t) ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N ,∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (10)
where φ(u1, . . . , uN ) is a continuous and concave func-
tion defined over the hyper-rectangle of all (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈∏
[0, umaxi ]. The constraint (9) ensures the time average utility
player i receives if all players use the suggestions of the
manager is at least as good as the utility it would receive
if all players used their baseline strategies.
The definition of optimality for (8)-(10) requires a more
careful treatment, and this issue is discussed more precisely
in the next subsection. In particular, the causality constraint of
the game manager does not explicitly appear anywhere in (8)-
(10). Regardless, it can be shown that the above problem is al-
ways feasible, so that it is always possible to satisfy constraints
(9)-(10) via a simple causal algorithm for game manager
decisions: Consider the trivial decisions (α˜1(t), . . . , α˜N (t)) =
(b1(t), . . . , bN (t)) for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. This means that the
game manager suggests nothing more than the baseline actions
for all rounds t. These suggestions are implementable in a
causal manner because they only use the baseline decisions
given to the game manager at the beginning of each round.
Since bi(t) ∈ Ai for all i and all t, one has α˜i(t) = bi(t) ∈ Ai
for all i, and so the constraints (10) are satisfied. Further, this
trivial suggestion strategy immediately implies ui(t) = xi(t)
for all t, and so constraint (9) is trivially satisfied.
Thus, it is always possible for a game manager to achieve
the constraints (9)-(10). The constraints (9) provide rational
players an incentive to use the suggested actions, since it
ensures the resulting time average utilities are at least as
good as those of the baseline decisions. Thus, it is assumed
throughout this paper that all players choose the suggestions
of the manager, so that α˜i(t) = αi(t) for all i and all t. In
particular, one has for all rounds t:
ui(t) = uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) (11)
xi(t) = uˆi(b(t), ω(t)) (12)
Define:
u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t))
u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t))
Under the assumption α˜i(t) = αi(t) for all i and all t, the
problem becomes:
Maximize: lim inft→∞ φ(u(t)) (13)
Subject to: lim inft→∞[ui(t)− xi(t)] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (14)
αi(t) ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N ,∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (15)
where ui(t) and xi(t) are defined in (11) and (12). The
problem (13)-(15) shall be referred to as the infinite future
knowledge optimization problem.
D. A modified objective
The infinite sequences ω(t) and b(t) for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
are arbitrary. In practice, these sequences might depend on
previous suggestions of the game manager. However, the
problem (13)-(15) does not specify how future values of ω(τ)
and b(τ) depend on control decisions. Thus, to understand
optimal utility in (13)-(15), it useful to view {ω(t)}∞t=0 and
{b(t)}∞t=0 as arbitrary sequences that are defined at the start of
the game but with values that are only sequentially revealed
as the game progresses. In this way, future values of ω(τ)
and b(τ) are not influenced by the emerging decisions of the
manager.
With this structure, optimality of (13)-(15) is defined over
all possible action sequences {α(t)}∞t=0 that provide utilities
with respect to the given {ω(t)}∞t=0 and {b(t)}∞t=0 sequences.
In principle, the supremum time average utility in (13) can be
computed offline based on non-causal knowledge of the full se-
quences {ω(t)}∞t=0 and {b(t)}∞t=0. Since optimality is defined
in terms of full knowledge of the future, the problem (13)-(15)
is called the infinite future knowledge optimization problem.
It is not clear if the supremum objective function value for
this problem can be achieved by a practical algorithm that
makes causal decisions. The stochastic optimization theory in
[12] shows that the supremum can be achieved in a causal
manner in the special case when the sequences {ω(t)}∞t=0
and {b(t)}∞t=0 have an ergodic structure.2 That is because,
in the ergodic case, the problem (13)-(15) fits into the general
framework of [12].
However, this paper considers problems with possibly non-
ergodic input sequences {ω(t)}∞t=0 and {b(t)}∞t=0. In this
context, it is not clear if the supremum in (13)-(15) can
be causally achieved. Remarkably, this paper shows that a
modified objective, defined in terms of a finite but arbitrarily
large window of time in which the future is known, can in
fact be causally achieved (to within any arbitrarily small but
2Specifically, [12] shows optimality can be achieved (arbitrarily closely)
in the case when the random event process is modulated by a finite state
irreducible (possibly periodic) discrete time Markov chain.
6positive error). This is done using the T -slot lookahead utility
developed in [12]: Fix T as a positive integer and partition
the rounds t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} into successive frames of size T ,
so that frame k consists of rounds {kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1}
(for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}). For each round k and for
given realizations of {ω(t)}∞t=0 and {b(t)}∞t=0, define ψT [k]
as the supremum objective value in the following optimization
problem, optimized over all choices of the decision vector
α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)):
Max: φ (γ1, . . . , γN ) (16)
Subj to: γi = 1T
∑(k+1)T−1
τ=kT ui (α(τ), ω(τ)) ∀i ∈ N (17)
γi ≥ 1T
∑(k+1)T−1
τ=kT ui(b(τ), ω(τ)) ∀i ∈ N (18)
αi(τ) ∈ Ai ∀τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1} (19)
γi ∈ [0, umaxi ] ∀i ∈ N (20)
In particular, if (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) and {α∗(τ)}(k+1)T−1τ=kT forms
an optimal solution to the above problem, then ψT [k] =
φ(γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ). The above problem is always feasible with
a well defined and finite supremum ψT [k]. In general, the
supremum may not be achievable. However, for all  > 0, there
are vectors (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) and {α∗(τ)}(k+1)T−1τ=kT that satisfy the
constraints of the above problem and that satisfy:
ψT [k]−  ≤ φ(γ∗1 , . . . , γ∗N ) ≤ ψT [k]
The value ψT [k] represents the maximum average utility
achievable over frame k provided that the regret constraints
are satisfied by averages over that frame, and assuming that
future values of the vectors b(t) and ω(t) are fully known
over the frame. Since ψT [k] requires knowledge of the future
to compute, it seems unlikely that a practical algorithm could
achieve performance that is competitive with the ψT [k] values.
Remarkably, this paper develops a causal algorithm (without
requiring knowledge of the future) that satisfies the constraints
(14)-(15) and that achieves:
lim inf
K→∞
[
ui(KT )− 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
]
≥ −BT/V
where B is a constant and V is a parameter that can be
chosen as large as desired (with a tradeoff in the corresponding
convergence time). This holds under the same algorithm for
all possible (finite) values of T . In particular, for any desired
value of T , it is possible to choose a sufficiently large value
of V so that long term performance is arbitrarily close to the
average of the ψT [k] values.
It can be shown that, for any T and for any {ω(t)}∞t=0
and {b(t)}∞t=0 sequences, the lim inf average of ψT [k] is less
than or equal the optimal objective function value in (13) for
the infinite future knowledge optimization problem. In cases
when sequences {ω(t)}∞t=0 and {b(t)}∞t=0 are ergodic and mild
additional assumptions are satisfied, the limiting average of
ψT [k] converges to this value as T →∞. However, this is not
true in general non-ergodic situations. In particular, example
sequences can be given for which the optimal value in (13) is
strictly larger than the following value:
lim inf
T→∞
[
lim inf
K→∞
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
]
Nevertheless, the average of ψT [k] still provides a meaningful
and challenging utility target.
IV. WEIGHTED SUM OF UTILITIES
This subsection considers a weighted sum of utilities, so
that:
φ(u1, . . . , uN ) =
N∑
i=1
θiui
for given real numbers θi. Subsection V considers the more
general case when φ(γ1, . . . , γN ) is any concave function.
A. Virtual queues
To achieve the time average constraint (14), for each i ∈ N
define a virtual queue Qi(t) that is initialized to Qi(0) = 0
and that has update equation:
Qi(t+ 1) = max[Qi(t) + xi(t)− ui(t), 0] (21)
where ui(t) = uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) and xi(t) = uˆ(α(t), ω(t)).
These virtual queues are kept in the game manager and
updated at the end of every round t based on its suggestion
α(t) and on knowledge of the ω(t) vector. Recall that the
manager knows all entries of ω(t) since each player i tells it
the values of ωj(t) for j ∈ Si, and ∪i∈NSi = {1, . . . ,M}.
The following queueing lemma is standard for stochastic
network optimization [12]. The proof is given for complete-
ness.
Lemma 1: (Virtual queues [12]) If Qi(t) satisfies (21) then:
a) For all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} one has:
ui(t) ≥ xi(t)−
[
Qi(t)−Qi(0)
t
]
b) If limt→∞Qi(t)/t = 0 for all i ∈ N , then constraints
(14) are satisfied.
Proof: From (21) one has for all τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}:
Qi(τ + 1) ≥ Qi(τ) + xi(τ)− ui(τ)
Thus:
Qi(τ + 1)−Qi(τ) ≥ xi(τ)− ui(τ)
Fix t > 0. Summing the above over τ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}
gives:
Qi(t)−Qi(0) ≥
t−1∑
τ=0
[xi(τ)− ui(τ)]
Dividing the result by t and rearranging terms gives the result
of part (a). Part (b) immediately follows.
A queue Qi(t) that satisfies limt→∞Qi(t)/t = 0 with
probability 1 is said to be rate stable.
7B. Drift-plus-penalty
Define Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . , QN (t)) and define ||Q(t)||2 =∑
i∈N Qi(t)
2. Define L(t) = 12 ||Q(t)||2, called a Lyapunov
function. Define ∆(t) = L(t+1)−L(t). The drift-plus-penalty
method of [12] observes Q(t), ω(t), and b(t) every round t,
and then takes a control action α(t) to minimize a bound on
the following expression:
∆(t)− V
N∑
i=1
θiui(t)
where V is a non-negative parameter that affects a perfor-
mance tradeoff. The intuition is as follows: Including the
drift term ∆(t) in the above minimization maintains stable
queues so that the time average constraints can be satisfied.
Including the penalty term −V ∑Ni=1 θiui(t) encourages the
controller to make decisions that give a desirable weighted sum
of utilities. Using larger values of V places more emphasis on
this “penalty minimization.”
Lemma 2: Under any algorithm for choosing α(t) ∈ A1 ×
· · · × AN , one has for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}:
∆(t)− V
N∑
i=1
θiui(t)
≤ B − V
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α(t), ω(t))
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(t) [uˆi(b(t), ω(t))− uˆi(α(t), ω(t))] (22)
where B = 12
∑N
i=1(u
max
i )
2.
Proof: Squaring (21) and using max[y, 0]2 ≤ y2 gives:
Qi(t+1)
2 ≤ Qi(t)2 +(xi(t)−ui(t))2 +2Qi(t)[xi(t)−ui(t)]
Summing over i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and dividing by 2 gives:
∆(t) ≤ 1
2
N∑
i=1
(xi(t)− ui(t))2 +
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)[xi(t)− ui(t)]
≤ B +
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)[xi(t)− ui(t)]
where the last inequality follows because (xi(t) − ui(t)) ∈
[−umaxi , umaxi ] for all t. Subtracting V
∑N
i=1 θiui(t) from
both sides and using ui(t) = uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) and xi(t) =
uˆi(b(t), ω(t)) gives the result.
The algorithm takes actions every round t to greedily min-
imize the right-hand-side of the drift-plus-penalty expression
(22). The only terms on the right-hand-side of (22) that are
affected by control decisions α(t) are:
−
N∑
i=1
V θiuˆi(α(t), ω(t))−
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)uˆi(α(t), ω(t))
The resulting algorithm is as follows: Initialize Qi(0) = 0
for i ∈ N . Every round t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, the game manager
observes vectors Q(t), ω(t), and b(t) and does the following:
• (Decisions) Choose suggestion vector α(t) =
(α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) as the solution to the following:
Maximize:
∑N
i=1 uˆi(α(t), ω(t))[V θi +Qi(t)]
Subject to: αi(t) ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N
• (Send suggestions) Send suggestions αi(t) to each player
i ∈ N .
• (Queue update) For each i ∈ N , update Qi(t) via (21).
It is clear that the above algorithm is causal: It only requires
knowledge of the current Q(t), ω(t), b(t) and does not require
knowledge of the future.
C. Performance for weighted utilities
The following theorem shows that the algorithm satisfies
constraints (14)-(15) with constraint violations that decay like
O(
√
V/t).
Theorem 1: (Constraint satisfaction) Fix V ≥ 0 and assume
the algorithm in the previous subsection is used with this V
and with Qi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . For all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}
one has:
a) ||Q(t)||t ≤
√
2B+2V
∑N
i=1 |θi|umaxi
t .
b) ui(t)− xi(t) ≥ −
√
2B+2V
∑N
i=1 |θi|umaxi
t .
c) The constraints (14)-(15) are satisfied.
Proof: Fix τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Since the algorithm makes
decisions for α(τ) to minimize the right-hand-side of (22),
one has:
∆(τ)− V
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ)
≤ B − V
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ))
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(τ)[uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))] (23)
where α∗(τ) = (α∗1(τ), . . . , α
∗
N (τ)) is any alternative vector
that satisfies α∗i (τ) ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N . A valid choice is
α∗(τ) = b(τ). Substituting α∗(τ) = b(τ) into the right-hand-
side of (23) gives:
∆(τ)− V
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ) ≤ B − V
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))
Rearranging terms gives:
∆(τ) ≤ B + V C (24)
where C =
∑N
i=1 |θi|umaxi . The above holds for all rounds
τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Fix t > 0. Summing (24) over τ ∈
{0, . . . , t− 1} gives:
L(t)− L(0) ≤ (B + V C)t
Since L(t) = 12 ||Q(t)||2 and L(0) = 0 one has:
||Q(t)||2 ≤ 2(B + V C)t
Dividing by t2 and taking square roots gives:
||Q(t)||
t
≤
√
2(B + V C)
t
8This proves part (a). Part (b) follows from (a) together with
Lemma 1. Part (c) follows directly from (b).
The above theorem does not use a value T . The value T
is also never used in the algorithm implementation. It is only
used in the performance theorem below.
Theorem 2: (Performance) Fix V ≥ 0 and assume the
algorithm in the previous subsection is used with this V and
with Qi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . For all positive integers T and
K the following holds:
N∑
i=1
θiui(KT ) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− TB
V
Theorem 2 shows that for any frame size T and for any
number of frames K, the weighted sum of utilities achieved
by this algorithm over the first T frames is at most TB/V less
than the average of the ideal T -slot lookahead values ψT [k]
over those frames. Notice that this holds for all frame sizes T .
Since the algorithm does not use a value T as input, the above
theorem can be viewed as a class of performance bounds that
are parameterized by T , all of which are satisfied. The error
term TB/V can be made as close to 0 as desired by choosing
V appropriately large. This is remarkable, particularly when
T is large, because the ideal ψT [k] value is defined in terms
of perfect knowledge of the future over T rounds, whereas
the algorithm does not know the future. The tradeoff is that a
large value of V affects the convergence time required to meet
the desired constraints, as specified by part (b) of Theorem 1.
Proof: (Theorem 2) Fix k as a non-negative integer.
Summing (23) over τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1} gives:
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
∆(τ)− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ)
≤ TB − V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ))
+
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
Qi(τ)[uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
≤ TB + 2B
T−1∑
m=0
m− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ))
+
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
Qi(kT )[uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
= T 2B − V T
N∑
i=1
θi
 1
T
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
uˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ))

+
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
Qi(kT )[uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
Now define γ∗ = (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) by:
γ∗i =
1
T
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
uˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ)) ∀i ∈ N
Then:
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
∆(τ)− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ)
≤ T 2B − V T
N∑
i=1
θiγ
∗
i
+ T
N∑
i=1
Qk(kT )
 1
T
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))− γ∗i

Now fix  > 0 and define α∗(τ) for τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k +
1)T − 1} as decisions that satisfy the constraints (17)-(20)
and yield:
ψT [k]−  ≤
N∑
i=1
θiγ
∗
i ≤ ψT [k]
It follows that:
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
∆(τ)− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ) (25)
≤ T 2B − V TψT [k] + TV (26)
This holds for all  > 0. Taking a limit as → 0 gives:
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
∆(τ)− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ)
≤ T 2B − V TψT [k]
Fix a positive integer K. Summing the above over k ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} gives:
KT−1∑
τ=0
∆(τ)− V
KT−1∑
τ=0
N∑
i=1
θiui(τ)
≤ T 2BK − V T
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
That is:
L(KT )− L(0)− V KT
N∑
i=1
θiui(KT )
≤ T 2BK − V KT 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
Dividing by V KT and using the fact that L(0) = 0 and
L(KT ) ≥ 0 gives:
−
N∑
i=1
θiui(KT ) ≤ TB
V
− 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
Therefore:
N∑
i=1
θiui(KT ) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− TB
V
9D. Discussion
Theorems 1 and 2 are deterministic results that are guaran-
teed hold on every sample path, regardless of the probability
model. Theorem 2 holds for arbitrarily large values of T
and shows that, for large K, averages over KT rounds give
time average performance that is arbitrarily close to the value
1
K
∑K−1
k=0 ψT [k], where ψT [k] is an ideal value based on
knowledge of T rounds into the future. If the {b(t)}∞t=0 and
{ω(t)}∞t=0 processes are ergodic and mild additional assump-
tions are satisfied, then the value 1K
∑K−1
k=0 ψT [k] approaches
the ergodic supremum of the problem (13)-(15) as T → ∞
and K → ∞. Intuitively, this is why the algorithm comes
arbitrarily close to the solution of (13)-(15) in the ergodic
case.
However, the solution of (13)-(15) requires perfect knowl-
edge of all time into the future, rather than just a finite
horizon of T slots into the future. Thus, in the general non-
ergodic case, the value 1K
∑K−1
k=0 ψT [k] does not necessarily
come close to the optimal objective function value in the
problem (13)-(15), regardless of how large the T value is
chosen to be. Nevertheless, the value 1K
∑K−1
k=0 ψT [k] is an
intuitively ambitious target, and it is remarkable that, in all
cases, this target can be achieved (arbitrarily closely) by a
causal algorithm.
V. CONCAVE FUNCTION OF UTILITIES
The previous section considered a weighted sum of utilities.
This section considers a general concave function of utilities.
Specifically, it uses a function φ(u1, . . . , uN ) that is concave
and continuous over (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈
∏N
i=1[0, u
max
i ]. Thus,
it treats the general problem (13)-(15). For simplicity of
exposition, assume the function φ(·) is non-negative over∏N
i=1[0, u
max
i ] (else, a positive constant can be added to it
to make it non-negative).
The idea is to introduce proxy variables γi(t) that relate to
running averages of player i utility. The proxy variables are
chosen every round t in the interval [0, umaxi ] and must satisfy:
lim
t→∞ [γi(t)− ui(t)] = 0 ∀i ∈ N
The above constraint is enforced by defining virtual queues
Zi(t) for all i ∈ N with update equation:
Zi(t+ 1) = Zi(t) + γi(t)− ui(t) (27)
By summing (27), is clear that for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} one
has:
ui(t) = γi(t)−
Zi(t)− Zi(0)
t
(28)
Therefore, it is desirable to make each queue Zi(t) rate stable.
The equality (28) implies:
||u(t)− γ(t)|| = ||Z(t)− Z(0)||
t
(29)
where:
u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t))
γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t))
Let Z(t) = (Z1(t), . . . , ZN (t)) be the vector of Zi(t)
values. As before, define Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . , QN (t)), with
queues Qi(t) defined in (21). Define a new Lyapunov function
that considers both types of queues:
L(t) =
1
2
||Q(t)||2 + 1
2
||Z(t)||2
Define ∆(t) = L(t + 1) − L(t). The first step is to compute
a bound on the new drift-plus-penalty expression:
∆(t)− V φ(γ(t))
where γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)).
Lemma 3: Under any algorithm for choosing α(t) ∈ A1 ×
· · ·AN and γ(t) ∈
∏N
i=1[0, u
max
i ], one has for all t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .}:
∆(t)− V φ(γ(t)) ≤ C − V φ(γ(t))
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)[uˆi(b(t), ω(t))− uˆi(α(t), ω(t))]
+
N∑
i=1
Zi(t)[γi(t)− uˆi(α(t), ω(t))] (30)
where C =
∑N
i=1(u
max
i )
2.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 and is
omitted for brevity.
A. General algorithm
The algorithm makes greedy decisions to minimize the
right-hand-side of (30) on every round t. Specifically, every
round t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, the game manager observes Q(t),
Z(t), ω(t), and b(t) and does the following:
• (Proxy variables) Choose γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) as
the solution to:
Maximize: V φ(γ(t))−∑Ni=1 Zi(t)γi(t)
Subject to: 0 ≤ γi(t) ≤ umaxi ∀i ∈ N
• (Suggestions) Choose α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) as the
solution to:
Maximize:
∑N
i=1 uˆi(α(t), ω(t))[Qi(t) + Zi(t)]
Subject to: αi(t) ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N
Next, for each i ∈ N , send suggestion αi(t) to player i.
• (Queue update) For each i ∈ N , update Qi(t) and Zi(t)
via (21) and (27).
This is again a simple causal algorithm that is implemented
as the game progresses.
B. Constraint analysis
Define φmax as the maximum of φ(γ) over γ ∈∏N
i=1[0, u
max
i ]. Such a maximum exists since it is defined over
a compact subset of RN and the function φ(γ) is continuous.
It is known that every continuous function over a compact set
is Lipshitz continuous, so that there is a positive value M such
that:
|φ(γ)− φ(r)| ≤M ||γ − r|| (31)
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for all γ, r ∈∏Ni=1[0, umaxi ].
Theorem 3: Fix V ≥ 0 and assume the algorithm in the
previous subsection is used with this V and with Qi(0) =
Zi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . For all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} one has:
a)
√∑N
i=1Qi(t)
2+Zi(t)2
t ≤
√
2C+2V φmax
t
b) ui(t)− xi(t) ≥ −
√
2C+2V φmax
t .
c) The constraints (14)-(15) are satisfied.
d) The utilities satisfy:
φ(u(t)) ≥ 1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ))−M
√
2C + 2V φmax
t
where u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) and M is the Lipschitz
constant in (31).
Proof: Since the algorithm makes decisions γ(t) and α(t)
to minimize the right-hand-side of (30) every round, one has
for all rounds τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}:
∆(τ)− V φ(γ(τ)) ≤ C − V φ(γ∗)
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(τ)[uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ))− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
+
N∑
i=1
Zi(τ)[γ
∗
i − uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
for any alternative vectors γ∗ ∈ ∏Ni=1[0, umaxi ] and α∗(τ) ∈
A1 × . . .×AN . Define α∗(τ) = b(τ) and γ∗ = (γ∗1 , . . . , γ∗N )
where γ∗i = uˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ)). Then the above inequality
becomes:
∆(τ)− V φ(γ(τ)) ≤ C − V φ(γ∗)
Rearranging terms and using the fact that 0 ≤ φ(γ) ≤ φmax
for all γ ∈ ∏Ni=1[0, umaxi ] gives the following for all rounds
τ :
∆(τ) ≤ C + V φmax
The result of part (a) then follows by an argument similar to
that of Theorem 1.
Part (b) follows from (a) together with (28). Part (c) follows
immediately from part (b) by taking a limit. To prove part (d),
note by Jensen’s inequality for concave functions that for any
round t > 0:
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≤ φ(γ(t))
≤ φ(u(t)) +M ||γ(t)− u(t)||
≤ φ(u(t)) +M
√
2C + 2V φmax
t
where the second inequality above follows by (31) and the
final inequality follows by part (a) together with (29).
Theorem 3 provides a bound on the achieved performance
φ(u(t)) in terms of the time average 1t
∑t−1
τ=0 φ(γ(τ)). The
next theorem completes the analysis by bounding the perfor-
mance of this time average in terms of averages of the ideal
ψT [k] values over T -slot frames.
Theorem 4: Fix V ≥ 0 and assume the algorithm in the
previous subsection is used with this V and with Qi(0) =
Zi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . For all positive integers T and K
the following holds:
1
KT
KT−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− TC
V
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is
omitted for brevity.
Combining the results of the above two theorems gives the
following performance guarantee for all positive integers T
and K:
φ(u(KT )) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
−TC
V
−M
√
2C + 2V φmax
KT
Rearranging and taking a limit as K →∞ gives:
lim inf
K→∞
[
φ(u(KT ))− 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
]
≥ −TC
V
For any T > 0, the right-hand-side above can be made
arbitrarily small by an appropriately large value of V , with
a corresponding convergence time tradeoff as specified in part
(b) of Theorem 3.
VI. MORE CONSERVATIVE CONSTRAINTS
This section considers a variation that requires the achieved
utility of each player on each round to be at least as large as
the corresponding baseline utility for that round. That is, the
time average constraint (14) is replaced by the more restrictive
constraint:
ui(t) ≥ xi(t) ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (32)
where we recall that:
ui(t) = uˆi(α(t), ω(t))
xi(t) = uˆi(b(t), ω(t))
The resulting problem of interest is:
Maximize:
lim inf
t→∞ φ(u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) (33)
Subject to:
uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) ≥ uˆi(b(t), ω(t))∀i ∈ N ,∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
(34)
αi(t) ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N ,∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (35)
where φ(u1, . . . , uN ) is again assumed to be a concave and
continuous function over
∏N
i=1[0, u
max
i ]. The above problem
is always feasible because the decisions α(t) = b(t) for all
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} trivially satisfy the constraints (34)-(35). If
the constraints of the above problem are satisfied, then the
constraints of problem (13)-(15) are also satisfied (but not vice
versa). Enforcing more restrictive constraints can reduce the
optimal objective function value. However, it provides players
an immediate guarantee that the suggested decisions are at
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least as good as the baseline decisions, whereas problem (13)-
(15) provides a similar guarantee only in the limit of a time
average over multiple rounds.
The above problem can be written more simply as follows.
Define:
u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t))
u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t))
For each b ∈ A1 × · · · ×AN and each ω ∈ Ω, define A(b, ω)
as the set of all action vectors α = (α1, . . . , αN ) that satisfy:
uˆi(α, ω) ≥ uˆi(b, ω) ∀i ∈ N
αi ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N
The set A(b, ω) is non-empty for all (b, ω) because it contains
the element b. The problem (33)-(35) is equivalent to the
following:
Maximize: lim inft→∞ φ(u(t)) (36)
Subject to: α(t) ∈ A(b(t), ω(t)) ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (37)
If the set A(b(t), ω(t)) contains only the single element b(t)
for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, then there are no decisions and the
game manager is forced to choose α(t) = b(t) for all rounds t.
In this case, the problem is so restricted that the game manager
cannot provide any utility gain. However, for many problems
the sets A(b(t), ω(t)) can have more than one element.
A. Weighted sum of utilities
First consider the special case:
φ(u1, . . . , uN ) =
N∑
i=1
θiui
where θi are real numbers. In this special case, the following
simple strategy is optimal: Every round t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
the game manager observes b(t) and ω(t) and then chooses
a vector α(t) ∈ A(b(t), ω(t)) to maximize the following
expression:
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α(t), ω(t)) (38)
To see why this is optimal, consider any sequences
{b(t)}∞t=0 and {ω(t)}∞t=0. A sequence of actions {α(t)}∞t=0
is said to be a feasible sequence of actions if α(t) ∈
A(b(t), ω(t)) for all t. Define {α∗(t)}∞t=0 as a feasible se-
quence of actions that maximize (38) on every round t. Let
{α′(t)}∞t=0 be any alternative feasible sequence of actions.
Then for all rounds τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} one has:
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α
∗(τ), ω(τ)) ≥
N∑
i=1
θiuˆi(α
′(τ), ω(τ))
Fix t as a positive integer. Summing the above over τ ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , t− 1} and dividing by t proves that:
N∑
i=1
θiu
∗
i (t) ≥
N∑
i=1
θiu
′
i(t) (39)
where u∗i (t) is the time average utility of player i over the
first t rounds under the actions {α∗(τ)}∞τ=0, while u′i(t)
is the corresponding time average utility under the actions
{α′(τ)}∞τ=0. The inequality (39) is true for all rounds t ∈
{1, 2, 3, . . .} and so it is also true when taking limits as t→∞.
B. General concave function of utilities
A naive attempt to solve (36)-(37) might consider the policy
of observing b(t) and ω(t) every round t and then choosing
α(t) ∈ A(b(t), ω(t)) to maximize φ(u1(t), . . . , uN (t)). The
previous subsection shows this naive policy is optimal in the
special case when φ(·) is linear. However, it is not necessarily
optimal when φ(·) is concave but nonlinear.
The problem (36)-(37) is similar to an opportunis-
tic scheduling problem for wireless networks, as consid-
ered in [13][14][12] via the drift-plus-penalty approach and
in [15][16][17][18] via different approaches. The works
[13][14][12] transform a problem involving the maximization
of a concave function of time averages into a problem of
maximizing the time average of a function. The same approach
is fruitful in this game theory context. Define proxy variables
γi(t) for all i ∈ N . Define γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)).
Consider the following problem:
Max: lim inft→∞ 1t
∑t−1
τ=0 φ(γ(t)) (40)
Subj to: limt→∞[γi(t)− ui(t)] = 0 ∀i ∈ N (41)
0 ≤ γi(t) ≤ umaxi ∀i ∈ N ,∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}(42)
α(t) ∈ A(b(t), ω(t)) ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (43)
Lemma 4: If {α(t)}∞t=0 and {γ(t)}∞t=0 are sequences of
decisions that satisfy the constraints (41)-(43), then {α(t)}∞t=0
is a feasible sequence of control actions for the original
problem (36)-(37) with the following utility guarantee:
lim inf
t→∞ φ(u(t)) ≥ lim inft→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) (44)
Proof: Let {α(t)}∞t=0 and {γ(t)}∞t=0 be sequences that
satisfy (41)-(43). Fix t > 0. By Jensen’s inequality and
concavity of the φ(γ) function one has:
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≤ φ(γ(t))
≤ φ(u(t)) +M ||γ(t)− u(t)|| (45)
where M is the Lipschitz constant for the function φ(·).
Taking the lim inf of both sides and using (41) proves (44).
Furthermore, since α(t) satisfies (43), it is a feasible sequence
of control actions for the original problem.
Lemma 4 suggests that one should make actions in an
effort to solve the problem (40)-(43). Any decisions that are
feasible for the problem (40)-(43) and that produce a “large”
value of the objective function will also be feasible for the
original problem with a corresponding objective function value
that is at least as large. Let vopt1 and v
opt
2 be the supremum
objective function values for the problems (36)-(37) and (40)-
(43), respectively. The above lemma implies that vopt1 ≥ vopt2 .
If (b(t), ω(t)) is ergodic, it turns out that vopt1 = v
opt
2 with
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probability 1 (see [12]), although this is not necessarily true
for general non-ergodic problems.
The Lyapunov optimization method can be used to treat the
problem (40)-(43). To enforce the constraints (41), for each
i ∈ N define a virtual queue:
Zi(t+ 1) = Zi(t) + γi(t)− ui(t) (46)
Define Z(t) = (Z1(t), . . . , ZN (t)). Define L(t) = 12 ||Z(t)||2
and ∆(t) = L(t+ 1)−L(t). As before, it can be shown that:
∆(t)− V φ(γ(t))
≤ D − V φ(γ(t))
+
N∑
i=1
Zi(t)[γi(t)− uˆi(α(t), ω(t))] (47)
where D is a constant. Minimizing the right-hand-side of (47)
every round t results in the following algorithm: Every round
t, the game manager observes Z(t), b(t), ω(t). Then:
• (Proxy variables) Choose γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) as
the solution to:
Maximize: V φ(γ(t))−∑Ni=1 Zi(t)γi(t)
Subject to: 0 ≤ γi(t) ≤ umaxi ∀i ∈ N
• (Suggestions) Choose α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) as the
solution to:
Maximize:
∑N
i=1 Zi(t)uˆi(α(t), ω(t)) (48)
Subject to: α(t) ∈ A(b(t), ω(t)) (49)
Then send these suggestions to the corresponding players.
• (Queue update) Update Zi(t) for i ∈ N via (46).
For simplicity, it is assumed throughout that for all t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .} there exists an α(t) that solves (48)-(49) (else,
the C-additive approximation theory of [12] can be used). It
follows that the resulting α(t) sequence is a feasible sequence
of control actions for the original problem (36)-(37). The next
subsection analyzes its performance.
C. Analysis for conservative constraints and concave φ(·)
Fix sequences {ω(t)}∞t=0 and {b(t)}∞t=0. Fix a positive
integer T . For k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} consider the following T -
slot lookahead problem, which uses decision variables γ =
(γ1, . . . , γN ) and α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)):
Maximize:
φ(γ) (50)
Subject to:
γi =
1
T
kT+T−1∑
τ=kT
uˆi(α(τ), ω(τ)) ∀i ∈ N (51)
α(τ) ∈ A(b(τ), ω(τ)) ∀τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1} (52)
Define ψT [k] as the supremum objective function value in
the above problem. Thus, for any  > 0, there is a sequence
of decisions α(τ) for τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1} and a
vector γ = (γ1, . . . , γN ) that together satisfy (51)-(52) and
also satisfy:
ψT [k]−  ≤ φ(γ) ≤ ψT [k] (53)
Theorem 5: Fix V ≥ 0 and assume the algorithm in the
previous subsection is used with this V and with Zi(0) = 0
for all i ∈ N . For all positive integers T and K the following
holds:
φ(u(KT )) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− DT
V
−M
√
2D + 2V φmax
KT
where M is the Lipschitz constant for the function φ(·) and
D is the constant in (47). In particular, for all positive integers
T one has:
lim inf
t→∞ φ(u(t)) ≥ lim infK→∞
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− DT
V
(54)
The theorem is proven in three parts.
Proof: (Part 1) This part proves that:
φ(u(KT )) ≥ 1
KT
KT−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ))−M
√
2(D + V φmax)
KT
(55)
To this end, note that (47) implies that for all rounds τ :
∆(τ)− V φ(γ(τ))
≤ D − V φ(γ∗(τ))
+
N∑
i=1
Zi(τ)[γ
∗
i (τ)− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))] (56)
where γ∗(τ) and α∗(τ) are any vectors that satisfy α(τ) ∈
A(b(τ), ω(τ)) and γ∗i (τ) ∈ [0, umaxi ] for all i ∈ N . Choose
α∗(τ) = b(τ) and γ∗(τ) = (γ∗1(τ), . . . , γ
∗
N (τ)) where
γ∗i (τ) = uˆi(b(τ), ω(τ)) for all i ∈ N . Substituting these
choices into (56) gives:
∆(τ)− V φ(γ(τ)) ≤ D − V φ(γ∗(τ))
and hence:
∆(τ) ≤ D + V φmax
Summing over τ ∈ {0, . . . ,KT − 1} gives:
1
2
||Z(KT )||2 − 1
2
||Z(0)||2 ≤ KT (D + V φmax)
Rearranging terms and using ||Z(0)|| = 0 gives:
||Z(KT )||
(KT )
≤
√
2(D + V φmax)
KT
From (46) it holds that and ||Z(KT )||/t =
||γ(KT )− u(KT )|| and so:
||γ(KT )− u(KT )|| ≤
√
2(D + V φmax)
KT
By (45) it follows that:
1
KT
KT−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≤ φ(u(KT )) +M
√
2(D + V φmax)
KT
which proves (55).
Proof: (Part 2) This part shows that:
1
KT
KT−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− DT
V
(57)
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To this end, note that summing (56) over τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k +
1)T − 1} gives:
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
∆(τ)− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
φ(γ(τ))
≤ DT − V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
φ(γ∗(τ))
+
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
N∑
i=1
Zi(τ)[γ
∗
i (τ)− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
≤ DT 2 − V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
φ(γ∗(τ))
+
N∑
i=1
Zi(kT )
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
[γ∗i (τ)− uˆi(α∗(τ), ω(τ))]
where the final step is similar to a step in the proof of Theorem
2. Fix  > 0 and define γ∗ = (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) and α
∗(τ) for τ ∈
{kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1} as the vectors that satisfy (51), (52),
(53), and define γ∗i (τ) = γ
∗
i for all τ ∈ {kT, . . . , (k+1)T−1}.
Substituting these into the above inequality gives:
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
∆(τ)− V
(k+1)T−1∑
τ=kT
φ(γ(τ))
≤ DT 2 − V TψT [k] + V T
Taking  → 0 and then summing over k ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}
gives:
L(KT )−L(0)−V
KT−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≤ DT 2K−V T
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
Dividing by V KT and using the fact that L(KT )−L(0) ≥ 0
gives:
− 1
KT
KT−1∑
τ=0
φ(γ(τ)) ≤ DT
V
− 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]
which proves (57).
Proof: (Part 3) This part proves (54). To this end, note that
parts 1 and 2 together imply:
φ(u(KT )) ≥ 1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− DT
V
−M
√
2D + 2V φmax
KT
Taking a lim inf of both sides as K →∞ gives:
lim inf
K→∞
φ(u(KT )) ≥ lim inf
K→∞
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ψT [k]− DT
V
(58)
It remains to show that the left-hand-side of (58) can be
replaced by lim inft→∞ φ(u(t)). To do this, fix t as a positive
integer. Let Kt be the non-negative integer such that KtT ≤
t < (Kt + 1)T . Then:
u(t) = u(KtT )
KtT
t
+
∑t−1
τ=KtT
u(τ)
t
In particular:
u(t) = u(KtT )− u(KtT ) (t−KtT )
t
+
∑t−1
τ=KtT
u(τ)
t
Thus:
||u(t)− u(KtT )|| ≤
√∑N
i=1(T − 1)umaxi
t
Thus:
φ(u(t)) ≥ φ(u(KtT ))−M
√∑N
i=1(T − 1)umaxi
t
Taking a lim inf of both sides as t→∞ gives:
lim inf
t→∞ φ(u(t)) ≥ lim inft→∞ φ(u(KtT ))
≥ lim inf
K→∞
φ(u(KT ))
This together with (58) proves the result.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper considers a stochastic repeated game where
players share information and a baseline decision with a game
manager at the beginning of each round. The manager provides
suggestions that, if taken, maximize a concave function of
average utilities across players subject to the constraint that
each player receives a time average utility at least as good
as it would get if all players used their baseline strategies.
A more conservative scenario was also considered where the
utility guarantee is enforced every round, rather than in a time
average. A Lyapunov optimization algorithm was developed
that satisfies the constraints and that ensures the concave
function of utilities is close to (or better than) an average of
T -slot lookahead values that are computed with knowledge
of T rounds into the future, regardless of the sample path.
This shows that a simple causal algorithm can achieve a target
defined in terms of future knowledge.
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